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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BLAKE STEVENS
and llARTFORD INSURANCE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. 19006

DWINN A. HENION, Mother of
BARI LYN BLAIR, daughter of
BARRY A. BLAIR, deceased, and
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Defendants.
BRIEF

PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
HONORABLE TIMOTHY C. ALLEN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This Petition is for the review of the Industrial Commiss1on's decision that •average weekly wages" under the Workmen's Compensation Act includes an out-of-town subsistence
allowance paid to an employee to cover expenses he would not
t1ave incurred but for his employment activities.

DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Application for dependent death benefits under the
Workmen's Compensation Act was heard by Administrative Law
Judge Timothy C. Allen.

Judge Allen awarded dependent death

benefits based upon an average weekly wage of $5.50 per hour
for a 35 hour work week and a $32.50 daily out-of-town subsistence allowance.

Plaintiffs filed a Motion to review the

inclusion of the subsistence allowance in the average weekly
wage.

The Industrial Commission denied the Motion.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff's seek a ruling that the •average weekly wage'
under the Workmen's Compensation Act does not include an
out-of-town subsistence allowance paid to an employee to
cover expenses he would not have incurred but for his employment activities.

Plaintiffs request that this Court reverse

the Industrial Commission's inclusion of this subsistence
allowance in the decedent's average weekly wage.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Dwinn Benion and decedent Barry A. Blair began
living together in July, 1981.
that she was pregnant.

One month later they learned

In September, 1981, they became en-

gaged and set their wedding date for March, 1982, two months
before their child was expected.
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This wedding date was later

crr•nPrl

until after the child's birth

SO

that Ms. Henion

' ' ', "ain single and receive free maternal care.
i rr1c

30,

t 1rnc

31,

During

they continued to reside in Salt Lake County.

(R.

35, 36, 63, 65).

While they were living together, decedent was employed by
Stevens Construction.
in the Salt Lake Valley Area.

Until November, 1981, he worked
In November, 1981, decedent

began working on a job in Green River, Wyoming.

Since this

work was out-of-town, decedent regularly travelled to Green
River on Monday and returned home on Friday night.

While

working in Green River decedent received a $32.50 per day
subsistence allowance in addition to his wage of $5.50 per
hour for a 35 hour work week.

On January 14, 1982, decedent

was electrocuted while working in Green River.
1982, decedent's posthumous child was born.

In June,

(R. 29, 47, 65,

66) •

The Industrial Commission awarded death benefits to decedent's posthumous child based upon an average weekly wage of
$355 per week.

This represents $192.50 in hourly wages and

$162.50 in subsistence allowance.

-3-

The plaintiffs challenge

the inclusion of the subsistence allowance in the average
weekly wage. 1
ARGUMENT
The Workmen's Compensation Act provides that those who
are wholly dependent upon a person who dies as a result of an
industrial accident shall receive weekly death benefits of
66-2/3% of the decedent's •average weekly wage• at the time
of injury, but no more than 85% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of injury.
(1953).

Utah Code Ann.

§

35-l-68(2)(b)(i)

The formula for computing the average weekly wage

where wages are fixed by the hour is described in Utah Code
Ann.

§

35-l-75(l)(e) (1953):

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act,
the average weekly wage of the injured employee at
the time of the injury shall be taken as the basis
upon which to compute the weekly compensation rate
and shall be determined as follows:
(e) If at the time of the injury the
wages are fixed by the hour, the average weekly wage
shall be determined by multiplying the hourly rate
by the number of hours the employee would have
worked for the week if the accident had not intervened. In no case shall the hourly wage be multiplied by less than 20 for the purpose of determining
the weekly wage.
lThe inclusion of the subsistence allowance in computing
the average weekly wage provides an additional $28,080 in
benefits over the first six years.
(The $355 average weekly
wage qualifies for maximum weekly payments of $218, while a
$192.50 average weekly wage qualifies for weekly payments of
$128.) If benefits are extended under Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-70 (1953) for more than twelve years, the difference
will exceed $84,000.
-4-

POINT
A
ALLOWANCE PAID TO AN EMPLOYEE
TO COVER EXPENSES HE WOULD NOT HAVE INCURRED BUT FOR EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES ARE NOT A
PART OF HIS AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGES UNDER THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.

Since dependent death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act arise by legislative enactment, whether a subsistence allowance is included in the •average weekly wage"
presents a question of statutory construction.

In resolving

this question, the legislative definition of •average weekly
wage" must control.

As set out in Utah Code Ann.

§

35-1-75,

where the wages are fixed by the hour, the average weekly
wage "shall be determined" by multiplying the hourly rate by
the number of hours that would have been worked during the
week of the accident.

The decedent's wages at the time of

the accident were fixed by the hour.

As a matter of law, the

Industrial Commission should have determined that the decedent's average weekly wage was $192.50, the hourly rate of
$5.50 per hour multiplied against the 35 hour work week.
Since the statutory formula does not include a subsistence
allowance for out-of-town work, its inclusion in the average
weekly wage by the Industrial Commssion was error.
This conclusion is not only mandated by the statutory
formula established by the legislature, but is also compelled
by

the formula's legislative history, the meaning of wages
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and subsistence allowances, and the policy of the Workmens'
Compensation Act.
A.

The Legislative History of § 35-1-75 Demonstrates A
Rejection Of The Industrial Commission's Def1n1tion.

The present
Laws ch. 76,

§

§

35-1-75 was enacted in 1971.

10.

It was modeled after

§

1971 Utah

19 of the "Work-

men's Compensation and Rehabilitation Law" proposed by The
Council of State Governments through its Committee on Suggested State Legislation.

See •workmen's Compensation and

Rehabilitation Law (Revised)" published in July, 1974 by the
Council of State Governments.

As noted by Professor Larson,

this section is somewhat different from the common wage-basis
statute and is an attempt to anticipate controversies under
the common statutes.
pensation (1981).

§

2 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Corn60.ll(a), footnote 77 ..

One of the controversies anticipated by the council was
whether the reasonable value of board, room, rent, housing,
lodging, fuel and similar advantages would be a part of average weekly wages.

The Council proposed that •wages• means:

[I]n addition to money payments for services rendered, the reasonable value of board, rent, housing,
lodging, fuel or similar advantage received from the
employer, and gratuities received in the course of
employment from others than the employer. § 2(n),
Workmens Compensation and Rehabilitation Law.
In enacting

§

35-1-75, the Utah Legislature did not

choose to adopt the Council's recommended definition.

-6-

In-

, , , ,,,i, our legislature made the hourly rate, in this case,
"'ntrolling factor.

The Industrial Commission's rede-

f1n1ng of "average weekly wages" to include what the legislature rejected is improper.
B.

The Meaning Of Wages Is Entirely Different From That
Of A Subsistence Allowance.

As commonly understood, wages are "money paid or received
for work or services, as by the hour, day or week."

The

Random House Dictionary of The English Language (1967).
Utah Code Ann.

§

In

34-28-2(2), the legislature adopted a simi-

lar definition in establishing the law governing the payment
of wages by employers:
The word "wages" means all amounts due the employee
for labor or services, whether the amount is fixed
or ascertained on a time, task, piece, commission
basis or other method of calculating such amount.
The same definition was used by the legislature in establishing wages as a preferred debt.

Utah Code Ann.

§

34-26-4.

In

all instances, the underlying nature of wages is monetary
remuneration for labor or services.
In contrast, a subsistence allowance is money paid in
addition to wages "to cover expenses [an employee] may incur
in performing his job."
English Language (1967).

The Random House Dictionary of The
Although both wages and subsistence

allowances are an employer's cost of doing business, the
similarity ends there.

A subsistence allownace is not re-

-7-

muneration for labor or services but rather payment to
employee expenses incurred because of the work.
the employee works, he receives wages.

So long as

However, he only re-

ceives a subsistence allowance so long as he incurs special
expenses because of the work.
In this case the decedent was earning wages of $5.50 per
hour.

At his employer's direction, he began working in Green

River, Wyoming for a time.

Since commuting from his home in

Salt Lake to Green River was impracticable, he would leave
for Green River on r.onday and return home on Friday night.
Because his work in Green River required him to incur lodging, meal and travel expenses he would not have otherwise
incurred, he was paid a $32.50 daily subsistence allowance to
cover, at least in part, these expenses.

To say that this

subsistence allowance represented remuneration for labor subverts the meaning of wages.

c.

The Policy Of The Workmen's Compensation Act Prohibits Inclucing A Subsistence Allowance In Average
Weekly Wages.

The underlying policy of the Workmen's Compensation Act
is to assure an employee and his dependents certain compensation, medical and disability benefits for industrial accidents without undue expense, delay or uncertainty.

State Tax

Commission v. Department of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297 (Utah
1982).

When an employee dies in an industrial accident, the

-8-

"'·,., l Jc u re has determined that his family should receive a
, '11tage of what the employee would have been expected to
in wages had he not died, all according to a strict
formula.

It was never intended that these benefits represent

anything more.
When the Industrial Commission included the subsistence
allowance in its award, the decedent's dependent benefited by
$28,080 over six years.

Had he not died, the decedent would

not have had this amount available for the care of his dependent.

Even assuming that his out-of-town work would have

continued that long, he would have been required to spend the
subsistence allowance on expenses incurred because of his
employment.

Thus, including the subsistence allowance in the

average weekly wage is nothing more than a windfall.
The windfall nature of including the subsistence allowance in average weekly wages is illustrated by a hypothetical.

Suppose that the decedent was still being paid $5.50

per hour and given a $32.50 daily subsistence allowance for
out-of-town work.

Working with him was a co-employee who was

also paid $5.50 per hour.

However, since this co-employee

lived near the worksite, he was not paid a subsistence allowance.

If both died in the same industrial accident, the

co-employee's dependents would receive $28,080 less in benefits, although the work and wages of both would have been the

-9-

same.

Yet because the decedent was incurring employment

related expenses for which he was being reimbursed and which
would no longer be incurred, his dependent would receive a
substantially greater benefit.
Such a result was not the intent of the legislature.
According to legislative policy, the hourly wage without the
subsistence allowance represents what the decedent would have
been expected to receive had he not died.
POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S RATIONALE FOR
ALLOWING DEATH BENEFITS BASED ON A SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE IGNORES STATUTORY MANDATE,
MISCONSTRUES THE CONCEPT OF ROOM AND BOARD
AND
THE CONCEPT OF REAL ECONOMIC
GAIN.
In denying the Motion for Review on the issue of the subsistence allowance, the Industrial Commission offered this
rationale:
With regard to the inclusion of the daily subsistence allowance as a part of the decedent's wage, we
are of the opinion that the Administrative Law Judge
made the correct decision. Professor Larsen [sic)
in his treatise The Law of Workmen's Compensation,
Section 60-12(a), cites with approval the inclusion
of room and board as a portion of wages on the basis
that it constitutes a real economic gain to the
employee. This has long been the policy of the
Commission and we see no reason to change it now.
Plaintiffs submit that this rationale is deficient for
three reasons.

First, it ignores the formula mandated by

-10-

1-1ute.
,, ,1

qa1n-

Second, it misconstrues the concept of room and
And third, it misapplies the concept of real economic

Before addressing each of these points, it should be
that whether "this has long been the policy of the

Commission" is irrelevant.
policy, governs.

The statute, not the Commission's

Like the Commission's long standing policy

of regulating hospital fees which was struck down by this
Court in Intermountain Health Care v. Industrial Commission,
657 P.2d 1289 (Utah 1982), this policy must be struck down as
contrary to law regardless of Commission policy.
A.

In Awarding Death Benefits Based Upon A Subsistence
Allowance, The Industrial Commission Ignored The
Formula Mandated By The Legislature.

Since workmen's compensation benefits arise by legislative decree, they are only so broad as the legislative
mandate provides.

Thus the proper place to begin an inquiry

as to the scope of benefits is the language of the statute.
As previously discussed, under

§

35-1-75, wages do not in-

elude a subsistence allowance for out-of-town employment.
Regardless what reasons the Industrial Commission may have
for wanting to change this law, they are duty bound to follow, not ignore it.
Not only has the Industrial Commission failed to consider
the statutory mandate, but it has also failed to recognize
that in those states where room and board has been allowed to
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the extent of real economic gain, the governing statutes

dif

fer from our statute.
In Leatherbury v. Early, 32 N.E.2d 99 (Ind. Ct. App.
1941), the Industrial Board awarded compensation based upon
earnings which included room and board at the saw mill where
the employee worked.

In affirming this award the Court ob-

served that the governing statute defined •average weekly
wages" as "earnings of the injured employee in the employment
in which he was working at the time of the injury."
N.E.2d at 100.

32

The Court went on to note that the statute

also contained the following provision for allowances:
Wherever allowances of any character made to an
employee in lieu of wages are specified part of the
wage contract, they shall be deemed a part of his
earnings. 32 N.E.2d at 100.
Since the statute specifically included allowances in lieu of
wages and that was the nature of the employee's room and
board, the Court concluded that its inclusion in earnings was
statutorily mandated.
In Leslie v. Reynolds, 179 Kan. 422, 295 P.2d 1076
(1956), the injured employee was a farm worker who received
in lieu of wages a home on the farm, utilities paid, an
automobile, and foodstuffs grown on the farm for use by the
family.

The Commissioner included the money value of these

allowances in computing compensation.
provided:
-12-

The governing statute

Wt.enever in this act the term 'wages' is used it
q," 11 be construed to mean the money rate at which
1 ''"
service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the accirlFnt, and shall not include gratuities received from
employer or others. Board and lodging when furn 1 shed by the employer as part of the wages shall be
included and valued at $5 per week unless the money
value of such advantages shall have been otherwise
fixed by the parties at the time of hiring. 295
P.2d at 1081.
Based upon this statute the Court determined that the inclusion of room and board was proper to the extent of real economic benefit.
As these two cases illustrate, the proper inquiry is not
what other jurisdictions do under different statutes but what
§

35-1-75 requires.

To do otherwise is to ignore the legis-

lative mandate.
B.

Treating The Out-Of-State Subsistence Allowance As
Room And Board Misconstrues The Concept Of Room And
Board.

In denying the Motion for Review, The Industrial Commission apparently relied on the following statement of Professor Larson:
In computing actual earnings as the beginning
point of wage-basis calculations, there should be
included not only wages and salary but any thing of
value received as consideration for the work, as,
for example, tips and bonuses, and room and board,
constituting real economic gain to the employee. 2
A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation,
§

60.12(a).

It should be observed that Professor Larson is not discussing
•hP

definition of "average weekly wages" but •actual earn-
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ings.•

The distinction is critical since Professor Larscc'

treatment of this question is based upon the commonest type
of workmen's compensation statute which employs the
of "earnings• not •average weekly wages."

Professor Larson

has properly observed that this type of statute differs from
that employed by Utah.
Compensation,

§

2 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's

60.11(2).

In addition, Professor Larson's

own statement distinguishes wages from room and board, the
former not including the latter in its definition.

Thus Pro-

fessor Larson's statement was not intended to cover the Utah
statute and observes that room and board is not commonly
understood to be wages.
Even assuming that it were an appropriate interpretation
of the Utah statute, it has been misconstrued by the Industrial Commission.

In addressing the issue of whether an

out-of-town subsistence allowance is wages, the Industrial
Commission uncritically equated an out-of-town subsistence
allowance with room and board.

Such a conclusion is unwar-

ranted.
In footnote 6 to the above-quoted statement, Professor
Larson cites various cases for the proposition that room and
board represents actual earnings.

A review of those cases

demonstrates that Professor Larson is referring to the provision of room and board in lieu of wages, much like the

-14-

1

""'ion statute in Leatherbury, supra.
,

t,

v.

For example, in

Industrial Commission, 151 Colo. 538, 379 P.2d 384

, , ,,, l),

the value of 1 i ving quarters provided to a motel

mandger

was given in lieu of wages.

In Bruno v. 414

w.

23d

12 A.D. 831, 209 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1961), a building
superintendent's rent free apartment was given in lieu of
wages and therefore a part of the compensation award.

And in

Hall v. Joiner, 324 So.2d 884 (La. App. 1975), an apartment
manager received a rent free apartment in lieu of wages which
was properly categorized as earnings.
Unlike the cases cited by Professor Larson, the decedent
here received his regular wage while working in Green River.
The out-of-town subsistence allowance was not given to cover
expenses unrelated to employment but rather expenses that
would not have been incurred but for the out-of-town employment.

They were not given in lieu of wages.

To say that

they were misconstrues the statement of Professor Larson.
C.

Including the Out-of-Town Subsistence Allowance as
Average Weekly Wages Misapplies the Concept of Real
Economic Gain.

Again considering the statement of Professor Larson upon
which the Industrial Commission apparently relied and assuming that an out-of-town subsistence allowance can be
equated to room and board, it still cannot be included in
average weekly weages since it fails to "constitute real

-15-

economic gain to the employee."

This point is illustrated

1

reviewing several representative cases where it was held thac
a subsistence allowance was not real economic gain to an
employee.
In Layne Atlantic Company v. Scott, 415 So.2d 837 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982), the employee received allowances for
out-of-town expenses.

The statutory definition of wages

included "the reasonable value of board, rent, housing, lodging or similar advantage received from the employer.•

The

Court held that such advantages could only be included to the
extent of real economic gain.

The Court went on to observe

that the out-of-town expenses ended with employment and coneluded:
In short, we cannot construe the term "wages"
to include a make-whole reimbursement for uniquely
work-related expenses that are created by and within
the employment. 415 So.2d at 839.
On this basis the Court reversed the deputy commissioner and
remanded for a redetermination of wages without the out-oftown expense allowance.
In Moorehead v. Industrial Commission, 17 Ariz. App. 96,
495 P.2d 866 (1972), the employee received a travel allowance
for out-of-town work.

The Industrial Commission refused to

include this allowance in the compensation award which actioc
was affirmed.

In finding no real economic gain to the em-

ployee the Court stated:
-16-

"IW]ages" do not include amounts paid to the employe
reimburse him for employment-related expenditures
r
a nature which would not be incurred but for his
'"'f loyment. Such payments are simply not intended
as compensation for services rendered. 495 P.2d at

869.

And in Solheim v. Hastings Housing Co., 151 Neb. 264, 37
N.W.2d 212 (1949), the employee was required to work out-oftown, leaving on Monday and returning home on Saturday.

In

addition to his salary, he received a subsistence allowance
which the lower court had included in his compensation benefits.

Although the governing statute specifically included

room and board in its definition of wages, the Court reversed
on the ground that the allowance was intended to cover employment incurred expenses not to compensate the employee.
Thus, the Court concluded there was no real economic gain to
the employee.
As illustrated by these cases, even where a statute defines wages as including allowances, a subsistence allowance
is not included since it is not a real economic gain to the
employee.

To include it in the award of compensation here

without such a statute not only goes beyond the statute, but
also misapplies the concept of real economic gain.
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CONCLUSION
The award of the subsistence allowance as a part of the
dependent death benefits by the Industrial Commission should
be reversed for the following reasons:
1.

Its inclusion is contrary to the statutory defini-

tion of average weekly wages as demonstrated by the statute's
language, history, concept and policy.
2.

It does not represent wages or real economic gain to

the employee.
DATED this 21st day of April, 1983.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
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1

certify that I have served two copies of this Brief on
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Eckersley, Suite 510 Judge Building,

R Fast Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah and two copies of this
Brief on The Industrial Commission, P. O. Box 5800, Salt Lake
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depositing them in the United States Mail, first class postage
prepaid.

